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Abstract
Background: Despite impressive advances in our understanding of the biology of novel influenza A(H1N1) virus, little is as
yet known about its transmission efficiency in close contact places such as households, schools, and workplaces. These are
widely believed to be key in supporting propagating spread, and it is therefore of importance to assess the transmission
levels of the virus in such settings.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We estimate the transmissibility of novel influenza A(H1N1) in 47 households in the
Netherlands using stochastic epidemic models. All households contained a laboratory confirmed index case, and antiviral
drugs (oseltamivir) were given to both the index case and other households members within 24 hours after detection of the
index case. Among the 109 household contacts there were 9 secondary infections in 7 households. The overall estimated
secondary attack rate is low (0.075, 95%CI: 0.037–0.13). There is statistical evidence indicating that older persons are less
susceptible to infection than younger persons (relative susceptibility of older persons: 0.11, 95%CI: 0.024–0.43. Notably, the
secondary attack rate from an older to a younger person is 0.35 (95%CI: 0.14–0.61) when using an age classification of #12
versus .12 years, and 0.28 (95%CI: 0.12–0.50) when using an age classification of #18 versus .18 years.
Conclusions/Significance: Our results indicate that the overall household transmission levels of novel influenza A(H1N1) in
antiviral-treated households were low in the early stage of the epidemic. The relatively high rate of adult-to-child
transmission indicates that control measures focused on this transmission route will be most effective in minimizing the
total number of infections.
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Introduction
Recent studies have begun to unravel key epidemiological
characteristics of novel influenza A(H1N1) virus, such as the
incubation time, generation interval, and case fatality rate [1–6]. A
major unknown is the infection probability per contact between an
infected and a susceptible person, and how this probability
depends on age and the use of antiviral drugs. Influenza is
transmitted largely through close contacts, and the major locations
where such transmission events take place are workplaces, schools,
and households [7–9]. Of these, households provide the best
defined setting and lend themselves naturally to study transmission
rates.
Although there is a large body of literature on household studies
for seasonal influenza, when a large proportion of the population is
immune to infection [10–14], reports on transmission of novel
influenza A virus within households remain scarce [4–5,15–16].
Yet, such studies are vital to be able to tailor preventive household
measures, not only because the characteristics of the novel
influenza A virus may differ from seasonal influenza A viruses
[17–19], but also because it is expected that for the novel influenza
A virus a much larger fraction of the population has little or no
pre-existing immunity.
Here we analyze detailed data from 47 households with a
confirmed index case. During the study period antiviral drugs
(oseltamivir) were provided therapeutically to confirmed infected
cases and prophylactically to their household members. Such a
policy has been predicted to reduce transmission to the extent that
it may contain a pandemic at the start and to provide substantial
benefit once a pandemic has taken off [7–8]. But as the timing of
taking antiviral drugs depends on when the first infected case in a
household has been detected, and the dose of antiviral drugs
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households that are provided with antiviral drugs. Our study
shows that in this setting overall transmission efficiency is low, and
that children are more susceptible to infection and less infectious
than older individuals.
Methods
Case definition and case finding
From 29 April 2009 until 15 August 2009, novel influenza virus
A(H1N1) infection was a notifiable disease in the Netherlands,
requiring medical doctors and laboratories to report the patient to
the Municipal Health Service when the disease is suspected or
identified. Cases are defined as any person with one of the
following clinical criteria: i) fever .38uC and signs and symptoms
of acute respiratory infection, ii) pneumonia (severe respiratory
illness), iii) death from an unexplained acute respiratory illness,
meeting at least one of the following epidemiological criteria in the
seven days before onset of the disease: 1) close contact to a
confirmed case of novel influenza A(H1N1) virus infection while
the case was ill, 2) travelling to an area where sustained human-to-
human transmission of novel influenza virus A(H1N1) is
documented, 3) working in a laboratory where samples of novel
influenza A(H1N1) virus are tested (EC decision 2009/363/EC)
[20].
In case of laboratory confirmation of novel influenza A(H1N1)
contact tracing was performed by Municipal Health Services.
Household and other close contacts of confirmed cases were tested
for novel influenza virus A(H1N1) [20]. 47 index cases (36% male)
and 109 household contacts (50% male) were enrolled in the study
in the period between 29 April and 23 June. Household contacts
were defined as persons living in the same residence as the index
case.
Throat swabs were taken from all persons in the households,
and analyzed using a general influenza A and a novel influenza
virus A(H1N1) specific real-time RT-PCR [21]. Laboratory testing
was performed by the National Influenza Centre in the Nether-
lands (Erasmus Medical Centre Rotterdam and National Institute
for Public Health and the Environment Bilthoven).
Until 23 June, oseltamivir treatment was recommended for all
laboratory confirmed cases and for their close contacts, regardless
of symptoms. Index cases and household contacts were put on
antiviral drug therapy within 24h after sampling if the test result
was positive. There were no significant differences between
households with and without secondary cases in the symptoms-
to-sampling delay (mean: 1.7 vs 1.6 days). The average delay
between the moment of onset of symptoms of the index case and
his/her initial sampling was 1.4 days (number of cases: 47; range:
22 to 4 days; median: 1 day). The average delay between the
moment of onset of symptoms of the index case and the sampling
of the household contacts was 2.9 days (number of persons: 109;
range: 1–7 days; median: 3 days), and between the moment of
onset of symptoms of the secondary case and his/her sampling was
0.6 days (number of cases: 9; range: 21 to 4 days; median: 1 day).
Persons that were found positive were usually sampled more than
once. However, persons that were negative in the first test were not
routinely tested for a second time.
All cases included in this study were from the period in which
novel influenza A(H1N1) was a notifiable disease in the Nether-
lands (29 April 2009 until 15 August 2009). During this period
both the diagnostic laboratories and the treating physicians were
required by law to immediately report suspected and confirmed
cases to the municipal health services. The municipal health
services approached suspected and confirmed cases and their
contacts for further investigation in the context of their task in
source investigation. Hence, no approval from a medical ethical
committee was required because novel influenza A(H1N1) was a
notifiable disease, and the (anonymized) information used in this
study was collected as part of the routine surveillance system. After
15 August, only hospitalised or deceased cases of novel influenza
A(H1N1) remained notifiable, and contact tracing and routine
antiviral treatment of cases and household members were halted.
Statistical analysis
The analyses are based on the final size distribution of multitype
stochastic SEIR models [13,14,22]. We classify persons as younger
(type 1) and older (type 2), with a default age classification of #12
versus .12 years. The parameters ni and ai denote the initial
number of susceptible and initially infected type i persons in a
household, respectively (i~1,2). We assume that there are no
persons that have prior immunity, so that total household size is
given by N=n 1+n2+a1+a2. The parameter Bi denotes the
probability that a type i (i~1,2) person escapes infection from
outside the household. In this setting the final size distribution is
determined by triangular equations for the ordered infection
probabilities P v1,v2Dn1,n2 ½  that can be solved recursively:
X j1
v1~0
X j2
v2~0
j1
v1
  
j2
v2
  
P v1,v2Dn1,n2 ½ 
P
2
k~1
B
nk{jk
k qk
P2
l~1 blk nl{jl ðÞ
hi vkzak
~1 ð1Þ
(j1=0,…, n1, j2=0,…, n2) [13,14,22]. For given ni and ai the final
size distribution is fully specified by the escape probabilities Bi, the
Laplace transforms qi s ½ defining the probability distributions of
the infectious periods, and the transmission parameters bij
(i,j~1,2) (see below for details). With equation (1) at hand the
final size probabilities can be calculated recursively, starting with
the probability that all persons escape infection (which is
determined by P 0,0Dn1,n2 ½  and can be calculated by taking
j2=j 1=0 in the above equation), and subsequently use
P 0,0Dn1,n2 ½  to calculate P 0,1Dn1,n2 ½  and P 1,0Dn1,n2 ½  , etcetera.
Since there was only limited transmission in the early stages of
the epidemic and no epidemiological links between households
could be found [20], we assume that households are independent.
Hence, the likelihood function is given by the product of the
likelihood contributions of the individual households. In practice,
it is computationally more efficient to use the log-likelihood instead
of the likelihood, and all calculations in this paper are based on the
log-likelihood function. As a service to the reader we have included
supporting information detailing the contributions of the individ-
ual households to the likelihood function in the specific case of an
infectious period of fixed duration (Table S1).
A number of additional simplifications can be made because of
the fact that there was only very little community transmission
during the study period: no additional transmission from the
outside into the household (B1=B 2=1) and precisely one index
case per household (a1=1 and a2=0,o ra1=0 and a2=1). The
assumption of no additional introductions from the outside into
the household is particularly convenient, as it enabled us to obtain
precise transmissibility estimates even with a study size of less than
50 households [23]. Because influenza virus infectious periods
show only limited variation [24], the duration of the infectious
period is assumed to be fixed (q s ½  ~exp {Ts ½  ). We have also
considered models with exponentially distributed infectious
periods, and arrived at the same conclusions (Table S2). For
simplicity and given the lack of evidence to the contrary we further
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q1 s ½  ~q2 s ½  ~q s ½  . Without loss of generality we measure time in
units equal to the duration of the infectious period and take T~1
[22]. Further, we make the standard assumption that individuals
make a fixed number of average contacts with each of the other
persons in the household (i.e. we assume density dependent
transmission) [25]. We have considered a model in which the
average number of contacts is constant per unit of time (i.e.
frequency dependent transmission) and arrived at essentially the
same conclusions (Table S3).
With the above assumptions, the transmission rate from a type j
infected to a type i susceptible person (i,j~1,2) is given by bij. The
secondary attack rate pij or probability that an infected type j
individual will infect a specific type i individual, given that the type
i individual is initially susceptible and not infected by another
person, is given by pij~1{exp {bij
  
[5,26]. Hence, the total
number of type i individuals that are potentially infected (i.e.
assuming that they are not already infected by another individual)
by an infected type j individual is binomially distributed with
probability pij (i.e. the secondary attack rate) and number of trials
given by the number of susceptible type i individuals.
The above model (labeled model E) is saturated and contains
four parameters. To investigate to which extent simpler models are
able to describe the data we consider a number of alternatives.
First, we make a proportionate mixing assumption which states
that the transmission parameter can be written as a product:
bij~biaj (model D). Specifically, we assume that transmission
among type 1 individuals is represented by a parameter b, so that
transmission from type 1 to type 2 individuals can be written as
b21~bg, where g denotes the relative susceptibility of type 2
individuals. Likewise, the transmission rate from type 2 to type 1
individuals can be written as b12~bf, where f denotes the relative
infectiousness of type 2 individuals. With this notation the
transmission rate among type 2 individuals is given by
b22~bfg . We simplified the proportionate mixing model further
by assuming that type 1 and type 2 individuals are equally
infectious (f~1)(model C), equally susceptible (g~1)(model B), or
equally susceptible and equally infectious (bij~b)(model A). For
completeness, to evaluate whether a transmission model is really
needed to explain the data we also considered a model in which
only the index case is infectious [25]. This model, however, is
biologically implausible, had low statistical support in the analyses,
and is therefore eliminated from further consideration.
Estimates of the parameters of interest are inferred from the
household infection data using the method of maximum
likelihood. Confidence intervals of the basic parameters, and
confidence areas (models B and C) and volumes (model D) of
parameter combinations are calculated on the basis of profile
likelihoods [27]. Confidence intervals and confidence areas of the
secondary attack rates, which are functions of the basic
parameters, are determined by calculation of the range of values
spanned of these functions on the confidence areas and volumes of
Figure 1. Overview of the household infection data. Household
data were collected during the initial phase of the novel influenza
A(H1N1) epidemic in the Netherlands. All household members,
including the index case, were given oseltamivir upon detection of
the index case. Each row represents a household and each square
represents a person. Grey squares denote persons that are not infected,
cyan squares correspond to index cases, and purple squares represent
infected household members. Households are numbered 1 through 47.
A distinction is made between younger persons (#12 years of age, left
of the household number) and older persons (.12 years of age, right of
the household number).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011442.g001
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ratio tests, and non-nested models using the small sample Akaike
Information Criterion (AICc) [28]. We base our main results on
the model with the lowest value of the AICc, and which is
therefore most strongly supported by the data [28].
Although the moment of sampling of household contacts was
probably close to ideal given that the generation interval of novel
influenza A(H1N1) is approximately 2.2–3.2 days [5–6,16–20], it
is possible that some cases had been missed because sampling was
performed too early or too late. The probability that a person does
not have disease given a negative test result is called the negative
predictive value of the test. To evaluate the robustness of our
results to missed cases, we consider negative predictive values of
the sampling and testing procedures ranging from 0.75 to 1, which
corresponds to a sensitivity of detection of true influenza A(H1N1)
cases ranging from 0.26 to 1. For a negative predictive value of
NPV, we reclassified each uninfected person in the original data set
(i.e., each person who tested negative) as infected with probability
12NPV. For each value of NPV, we repeated this procedure 1000
times to assemble 1000 alternative sets of true infection states that
could have resulted in the observed data when infection was
confirmed using a test with implied sensitivity
Se~
0:083
0:083z0:917 1{NPV ðÞ
, ð2Þ
where 9/109<0.083 is the proportion of household contacts who
tested positive for novel influenza A(H1N1).
Results
In the period from 30 April 2009 to 22 June 2009 there were 47
households with a single virologically confirmed index case and
one or more household members. All these households were
included in the study. In 13 households the index case was 12
years or younger, and in the remaining 34 households the index
case was older than 12 years. The average age of the index cases
was 30 years (range: 3–69 years), which is comparable to the age
distribution of infected cases in the initial phase of the pandemic
when novel influenza A(H1N1) was still a notifiable disease in the
Netherlands, and when most cases had a travel history to Mexico
or the US.
20 Infection of a total of 9 household members was
confirmed in 7 out of 47 households; in all but one household the
secondary infections occurred in households where the index case
was older than 12 years. Of the nine household transmission
events, six were to a younger person (#12 years), and three to an
older person (.12 years). Figure 1 gives an overview of the data.
The overall probability of transmission of infection from an
infected person to an exposed household member is estimated at
0.075 (95%CI: 0.037–0.13) if younger and older household
member are assumed to have similar levels of susceptibility and
infectiousness (Table 1). Next we categorized index cases and their
household members by age into those of 12 years and younger
(who most likely received a lowered dose of oseltamivir) and those
aged 13 years and older (who usually received the standard dose of
oseltamivir). We detected a trend for a difference in infectiousness
between younger and older cases, with older cases being more
infectious than younger cases (model A vs B, x1
2~2:5, p~0:11),
and compelling statistical evidence for a difference in susceptibility
between younger and older persons, with older persons being less
susceptible than younger ones (model A vs C, x1
2~9:8, p~0:002).
As a consequence, the probability of transmission to a younger
person is substantially higher than that of transmission to an older
person (Figure 2).
The data also lend statistical support for simultaneous age-
specific differences in infectiousness and susceptibility (model B vs
D, x1
2~10:0, p~0:002; model C vs D, x1
2~2:7, p~0:10), with
older persons being less susceptible and more infectious than
younger persons. There is no support for a statistical interaction
between infectiousness and susceptibility (model D vs E, x1
2~0:8,
p~0:37). If we take the model with the highest statistical support
(model D) the estimated probabilities of infection are 0.35 (95%CI:
Table 1. Estimated secondary attack rates.
model estimated secondary attack rate (95%CI) number of parameters AICc empirical support
A y/oRy/o : 0.075 (0.037–0.13) 1 57.4 0.02 (weak)
By Ry/o : 0.028 (0.0051–0.10) 2 57.1 0.02 (weak)
oRy/o : 0.11 (0.049–0.20)
C y/oRy : 0.24 (0.10–0.43) 2 49.8 0.82 (substantial)
y/oRo : 0.032 (0.0080–0.080)
Dy Ry : 0.092 (0.0056–0.34) 3 49.4 1 (strong)
yRo : 0.011 (0.00057–0.056)
oRy : 0.35 (0.14–0.61)
oRo : 0.048 (0.012–0.12)
Ey Ry : 0.13 (0.0086–0.42) 4 51.0 0.45 (substantial)
yRo : 0 (0–0.059)
oRy : 0.32 (0.12–0.59)
oRo : 0.057 (0.014–0.14)
The secondary attack rates are defined as the person-to-person transmission probabilities over the complete infectious period of the infected person. Household
members are categorized as younger (#12 years of age, ‘y’) and older (.12 years of age, ‘o’). In model A the secondary attack rate does not depend on age, while in
models B and C the secondary attack rates depend on the age of the infector (model B) or infected (model C). In models D and E the secondary attack rates depend
both on the age of the infector and the age of the infected. In model E a separate transmission parameter is estimated for each transmission route, while in model D the
secondary attack rates are based on the estimated relative susceptibility and infectiousness of older relative to younger persons. Calculation of the empirical support
relative to the most likely model is based on the small sample Akaike’s Information Criterion (AICc).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011442.t001
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0.012–0.12) among older persons. Because there is only one
transmission event from a younger index case to another
household member (Figure 1), the estimated probabilities of
infection from younger persons to other household members are
low. Overall, since the number of younger persons is substantially
smaller than the number of older persons the estimated
probabilities of transmission to younger persons are less precise
than those of transmission to older persons (Figure 3). This is true
if the case is an older person (Figure 3, top panel), and if the case if
a younger person (Figure 3, bottom panel).
The testing procedures are not perfect, and it may be that a
number of persons that are classified as uninfected were actually
infected. This is mainly due to the fact that the timing of sampling
is critical whether or not the test yields a positive result.
Specifically, in view of the fact that the case finding procedure
included taking swabs from all household members, and analysing
these by a novel influenza A(H1N1) specific PCR it seems
reasonable that the specificity of the testing procedure is close to
100%, while the sensitivity depends on the delay between the onset
of symptoms of the index case and sampling of his/her household
contacts. On average, this delay was 2.9 days, while the delay
between the onset of symptoms of secondary cases and sampling of
secondary case was 0.6 days (see Methods for details). Given that
the generation interval of novel influenza A(H1N1) is probably in
the range 2–4 days [5–6,16–20], we believe that the moment of
sampling of household contacts may have been close to optimal.
Nevertheless, it is possible that we may have missed a couple of
cases, and we have reanalysed the data while explicitly accounting
for the possibility that test sensitivity is not 100% (see Methods).
The analyses reveal that our findings are robust, and that even if
the negative predictive value is as low as 80% (implying a test
sensitivity of just 31%), there is evidence for older persons being
less susceptible to infection than younger persons, while there is
evidence for younger cases to be less infectious than older cases if
negative predictive value is at least 95% (implying a test sensitivity
of at least 64%)(Table 2, Figure 4).
Throughout we have categorized persons using an age
classification of #12 years versus .12 years, which coincides
with the age above which a standard dose of oseltamivir is
recommended. We also investigated the data using an age
classification of #18 years versus .18 years. Using this age
classification there were 52 younger and 104 older persons in the
47 households. Of the 47 households, there were 18 households
with a younger index case, and the remaining 29 households had
an older index case. There were 6 younger secondary infections
and 3 older secondary infections, which coincides with our earlier
age classification. Again, we find statistical support for age-
Figure 2. Estimated secondary attack rates for model C. Estimated secondary attack rates to younger (#12 years of age) and older household
members (.12 years of age). The maximum likelihood estimate is given by a red dot, and the 95% confidence region is indicated by the shaded area.
The results are obtained using model C in Table 1. Note that the secondary attack rates are low, and that the entire 95% confidence region is below
the identity line where younger and older persons are equally susceptible. The secondary attack rates to younger and older persons are determined
by the basic transmission parameters through 1{exp {b ½  and 1{exp {bg ½  , where b and g denote the transmission rate parameter among
younger persons and the relative susceptibility of older persons.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011442.g002
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members being less susceptible and more infectious than younger
household members (Table 3). In comparison with the analyses
with the original age classification the estimated secondary attack
rates to younger persons are lower, while the precision of the
estimates increase. This is due to the fact that the total number of
younger persons is higher than in the analyses with an age cut-off
of 13 years (52 versus 35). On the other hand, estimates of the
secondary attack rate from older persons to older persons increase,
while the precision of the estimates decreases.
To further test the robustness of the results we have analyzed
model scenarios with exponentially distributed infectious periods
(Table S2) and with frequency dependent instead of density
dependent transmission (Table S3). The frequency dependent
transmission models fit the data better than the density dependent
transmission models, suggesting that secondary attack rates may be
lower in larger households than in smaller households. Overall,
however, the analyses indicate that our main conclusions of limited
overall transmission, and higher susceptibility of younger persons
are robust, and are also found in alternative model scenarios.
Discussion
Based on detailed early data from the Netherlands we have
estimated transmission probabilities of novel influenza A(H1N1) in
human households where the index case and household members
use the antiviral drug oseltamivir. In this setting the overall
transmission levels are low (0.075, 95%CI:0.037–0.13), children
are substantially more susceptible to infection than adolescents and
adults, and the highest secondary attack rates are found for
transmission from an older case to a younger person. Specifically,
the estimated secondary attack rate from an older case to a
younger person is 0.35 (95%CI: 0.14–0.61) when using an age
classification of #12 versus .12 years, and 0.28 (95%CI: 0.12–
0.50) using an age classification of #18 versus .18 years.
Earlier studies that focused on seasonal influenza A have found
similar household infection probabilities, and similar differences
between children/adolescents and adults. For instance, analysis of
data from the 1977–1978 H3N2 epidemic indicate that the
household infection probabilities are approximately 0.25 for
transmission to a child/adolescent and 0.10 for transmission to
an adult [11,13–14], while analyses of two trials aimed at
estimation of the efficacy of prophylactic use of oseltamivir and
that were carried out in 1988–1999 and 2000–2001 yielded
estimated child-to-child and adult-to-adult secondary attack rates
of 0.15 and 0.086, respectively [26,29–31].
A number of recent household studies have investigated the
transmissibility of novel influenza A(H1N1) in Japan, The United
Kingdom, and the United States [4–5,15–16]. Overall, the
percentage of infected non-index cases ranged from less than
5% to more than 25%, with percentages infected of 8–11% and
13% in the largest studies [4,16]. These figures correspond
reasonably well with our finding of 9/109=8.3% infected non-
index cases. Our results also confirm the earlier finding that
younger persons are substantially more susceptible to infection
than older persons [4,15–16]. Interestingly, our tailored analyses
suggest (non-significantly) that older cases may be more infectious
than younger cases, which had not been observed before.
We have quantified novel influenza A(H1N1) household
transmission in a setting where all persons were given the antiviral
drug oseltamivir. Because antiviral drugs were given to all persons
this makes it impossible to estimate antiviral efficacy for
susceptibility and infectiousness. However, assuming that the
efficacy of oseltamivir against novel influenza A(H1N1) is not
different from its efficacy against seasonal influenza A viruses, we
could use published antiviral efficacy estimates to gauge what the
transmission probabilities would have been in case that no
antiviral drugs were given [9]. Arguing along these lines and
focusing on the antiviral efficacy for susceptibility, one can obtain
rough estimates for what the secondary attack rates would have
been if no antiviral drugs were used. For instance, if we focus on
model D in Table 1 and make the plausible assumption that
antiviral efficacy for susceptibility is 0.50 [9], the transmission rates
would increase from an estimated 0.097 (yRy), 0.011 (yRo), 0.43
Table 2. Impact of test sensitivity on the parameter estimates.
negative predictive value
1 implied test sensitivity
1
relative susceptibility of older
persons (95%CI)
relative infectiousness of older
persons (95%CI)
100% 100% 0.11
2 4.4
1
95% 64% 0.24 (0.12–0.44) 2.2 (0.97–7.8)
90% 47% 0.35 (0.17–0.63) 1.7 (0.73–5.1)
85% 38% 0.45 (0.21–0.82) 1.5 (0.69–4.1)
80% 31% 0.52 (0.27–0.98) 1.3 (0.70–3.2)
75% 26% 0.59 (0.31–1.1) 1.3 (0.68–2.8)
Overview of the impact of imperfect test sensitivity on the estimated susceptibility and infectiousness of older persons (.12 years of age) relative to younger persons
(#12 years of age). The results are obtained using model D in Table 1. For each assumed value of the negative predictive value we give the medians of the parameter
estimates of 1000 simulated datasets with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (between brackets).
1: see equation (2) for the calculation of implied test sensitivity.
2: 95% confidence intervals calculated using the profile likelihood are (0.024–0.43) for relative susceptibility and (0.77–83) for relative infectiousness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011442.t002
Figure 3. Estimated secondary attack rates for model D. Estimated secondary attack rates from older (.12 years of age) and younger
household members (#12 years of age). The maximum likelihood estimate is given by a red dot, and the 95% confidence regions are indicated by the
shaded areas. The results are obtained using model D in Table 1. The top panel shows the results for transmission from older cases, and the bottom
panel for transmission from younger cases. For younger cases the secondary attack rates to younger and older persons are given by 1{exp {b ½  and
1{exp {bg ½  , where b and g denote the transmission rate parameter among younger persons and the relative susceptibility of older persons. For
older cases the secondary attack rates are 1{exp {bf ½  and 1{exp {bfg ½  , where f denotes the relative infectiousness of older persons.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011442.g003
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(yRy), 0.022 (yRo), 0.86 (oRy), and 0.098 (oRo) per infectious
period. This in turn translates into secondary attack rates of 0.18
(yRy), 0.022 (yRo), 0.58 (oRy), and 0.093 (oRo). Hence, if the
estimated secondary attack rates are small the secondary attack
rates without antiviral drugs increase approximately by a factor
1
1{AVES
, and by less if the estimated secondary attack rates are
already high. Although the projected secondary attack rates of
0.18, 0.022, 0.58, and 0.093 in a situation where no antiviral drugs
would have been given are substantially higher than the original
estimates of Table 1, they are still fairly low except for the older-to-
younger transmission route.
Our finding of limited overall household transmission for a
novel influenza virus against which little pre-existing immunity
exists could be due to the fact that antiviral drugs were given to all
household members upon detection of infection. In fact, it is
known that antiviral drugs are effective both in preventing
infection as well as mitigating the severity of infection, with the
former probably more important than the latter [9,29–33]. An
alternative explanation is that influenza transmission in general is
suppressed in summer season. It is known that influenza epidemics
in temperate regions are highly seasonal, and that this seasonality
may be modulated by environmental conditions such as
temperature and humidity [34–35]. This explanation is not fully
satisfactory, however, as not all estimated transmission rates are
low, in particular the rate of transmission from older to younger
persons.
Overall, our results of limited overall transmission and higher
susceptibility of younger persons are robust. In fact, we obtain
similar results in a variety of alternative analyses, e.g., using a
different age classification (Table 3), allowing for misclassification
due to imperfect test sensitivity (Table 2, Figure 3), using a highly
variable distribution of the infectious period (Table S2), or
assuming frequency dependent instead of density dependent
transmission (Table S3). It is of note that some of the alternative
analyses give a slightly better fit to the data than our default
analyses. For instance, a model with a highly variable exponen-
tially distributed infectious period (Table S2) fits the data slightly
better than a model with a fixed infectious period (Table 1). This
does not reflect current understanding of the epidemiology of
influenza, however, as it is known that influenza A infections show
only very limited variation in the period of shedding [24].
Table 3. Estimated secondary attack rates using an alternative age classification.
model estimated secondary attack rate (95%CI) number of parameters AICc empirical support
A y/oRy/o : 0.075 (0.037–0.13) 1 57.4 0.05 (weak)
By Ry/o : 0.019 (0.0054–0.078) 2 53.7 0.30 (substantial)
oRy/o : 0.15 (0.067–0.26)
C y/oRy : 0.16 (0.068–0.30) 2 54.3 0.22 (substantial)
y/oRo : 0.036 (0.0092–0.092)
Dy Ry : 0.043 (0.0025–0.18) 3 51.3 1 (strong)
yRo : 0.010 (0.00053–0.051)
oRy : 0.28 (0.12–0.50)
oRo : 0.073 (0.018–0.19)
Ey Ry : 0.071 (0.0044–0.26) 4 52.6 0.52 (substantial)
yRo : 0 (0–0.045)
oRy : 0.26 (0.091–0.48)
oRo : 0.086 (0.022–0.21)
Estimated secondary attack rates using an alternative age classification of #18 versus .18 years of age. The lay out and model scenarios are as in Table 1. Here, too, we
find low secondary attack rates and strong statistical support for age-dependent susceptibility and infectiousness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011442.t003
Figure 4. Age-specific susceptibility and infectiousness. Shown
are the estimated susceptibility and infectiousness of older (.12 years
of age) relative to younger (#12 years of age) persons. Small dots
indicate the parameter estimates for 1000 simulated datasets of actual
infected states assuming negative predictive value of 90% (cyan;
implied test sensitivity 47%) and 80% (purple; implied test sensitivity
30%). The results are obtained using model D in Table 1. Large dots
represent median values of the parameter estimates. Irrespective of the
negative predictive value, older persons are less susceptible than
younger persons; if the negative predictive value is at least 95%
(implied sensitivity: 64%), older cases are also more infectious than
younger cases (cf. Table 2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011442.g004
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i.e. which assumes that a person makes a fixed number of contacts
per unit of time, also gives a better fit to the data than our
conventional density dependent transmission model which as-
sumes that a person makes a fixed number of contacts with each of
the other household members per unit of time [25]. Since the number of
households and the variation in household sizes in our study (2–6)
is limited it is difficult to judge the relevance of this finding. It
could, however, have important implications as the overall attack
rates are expected to increase with increasing household size in a
density dependent model but remain approximately constant in a
frequency dependent transmission model.
We envisage four possible explanations for the observed
differences in attack rates between younger and older persons.
First, differences in susceptibility may be related to antiviral
treatment [9,29–33]. In the Netherlands, children under 10–12
years of age or weighing less than 40kg are prescribed a lower dose
of oseltamivir than adults (75mg per 12h in adults to 30/45mg per
12h in children 1–6 years old), and this could conceivably have a
negative impact on the effectiveness of the drug. Second,
compliance with antiviral treatment is often imperfect, especially
in children, because of the side effects associated with the use of
oseltamivir, while the protective effect in children is possibly
smaller than in adults [33]. Third, the nature of contacts between
children and adults could be such that the virus is more easily
transmitted from an adult to a child than the other way around. In
this case, a contact that is sufficient for transmission from an adult
to a child may not be sufficient for transmission from child to
adult, and case contacts are said to be asymmetrical [36]. Fourth,
children may be intrinsically more susceptible to infection than
adults. Possible reasons for such differences include pre-existing
immunity in adults. This is an attractive explanation which is
consistent with observations and estimates for seasonal influenza A
[8,12]. Regardless of the precise explanation for the observed
difference our results suggest that preventive household measures
can be made more effective by focusing specifically on the adult-
to-child transmission route.
Supporting Information
Table S1 Likelihood contributions of the individual households.
For each of the 47 households the infectious period is assumed to
be of fixed duration while using the standard age classification
(,=12 versus .12 years of age).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011442.s001 (0.03 MB
PDF)
Table S2 Estimated secondary attack rates using an exponen-
tially distributed infectious period. Household members are
categorized as younger (,=12 years of age, ‘y’) and older (.12
years of age, ‘o’). See Table 1 for overview of model scenarios.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011442.s002 (0.04 MB
PDF)
Table S3 Estimated transmission rate parameters assuming
frequency dependent transmission. Household members are
categorized as younger (,=12 years of age, ‘y’) and older (.12
years of age, ‘o’). See Table 1 for overview of model scenarios.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011442.s003 (0.05 MB
PDF)
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